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ARTICLES
ADDRESSING HATE MESSAGES AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA: REGULATING AND
EDUCATING
Thomas Huff*
Following a Gay Pride Week speakout, Brandon Lahren, a
student resident of Jesse Hall, said he "returned to his dorm
room to find materials he had placed on his door burned .... In
frustration Lahren placed 'silence equals death' stickers on the
doors of two residents whom he suspected of harassing him. 'The
next thing I know, there's a bunch of people standing outside my
door yelling and pounding,' Lahren said Monday. 'They were
yelling 'Come on out faggot,' and 'You know you want it, so come
on out faggot.' I was scared.' '
"Robert 'Dez' Freeman . . . returned to his dormitory room
to find posters that said 'Nigger' tacked to his door. Freeman
said the posters appeared after he was elected [Knowles Hall]
president."2
A teaching assistant working in a course required for theWomen's Studies Emphasis in the Liberal Arts Program re-
ceived the following remark on an anonymous course evaluation
form: "The TA is a feminist opposed to philosophical discus-
* Ph.D., Rice University 1968; B.A., University of Colorado 1963. Professor of Philoso-
phy and Lecturer in Law at the University of Montana. Stimulating conversations with, and
trenchant criticism from, Bari Burke have made this essay much better than it would other-
wise have been. Thanks are due my colleagues Larry Elison, Carl Tobias, and Maxine Van
de Wetering for their comments on drafts of this essay. My colleague Scott Burnham, while
serving on the University of Montana's Student Conduct Code Committee, stimulated my
initial interest in the issues of this essay. Thanks are also due the editors of the Montana
Law Review, and especially Jeffrey Monhart, for their careful editing of the manuscript.
The University of Montana provided financial help with a summer research grant. Errors
that remain are mine.
1. Dave Zelio, Gay Bashing Examined, MONTANA KAIMIN, May 14, 1991, at 1. The
MONTANA KAIMIN is the University of Montana student newspaper.
2. Kathy McLaughlin, 'Nigger' Posters Spur Education Campaign, MONTANA KAIMIN,
Nov. 19, 1991, at 1.
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sions with a male she feels is wrong, though I'd still fuck her!"3
Several Native American students living in married stu-
dents' housing found on their cars a racist/anti-Semitic flyer
from the "Church of the Creator-Save the White Race." The
students believed the flyers were selectively distributed to cars
with license numbers from counties in which reservations are lo-
cated. One student expressed fear for the safety of Native Amer-
ican children living in married students' housing. She pointed
out these were racists who had singled out Native American stu-
dents ds the targets of their messages.4
At a basketball game between Western Montana College of
the University of Montana and Rocky Mountain College, two Af-
rican-American players from RMC were subjected to the follow-
ing comments from the WMC cheering section: "Nice shot nig-
ger," "You ain't nothin' nigger," and "Go home nigger." One
Native American player was called "Kemosabe," and the song
made notorious by the Atlanta Braves was sung when this player
shot free throws. The crowd also would pat their hands over
their mouths making child-like "Indian" sounds.5
At a public forum on campus held to discuss proposed hate
speech regulations, a female faculty member, after describing
her experiences of anti-Semitism as a child growing up in New
York City, told the following story: "Four years ago, as a Profes-
sor at the University of Montana, secure in my career, loving my
work, and at home in a state I had been a citizen of for over
twenty years, I drove into the parking lot at the library ...
There were New York license plates on my car. As I got out of
the car, a young man in a pickup with Montana plates on it
screamed out at me, 'Go back to New York you dirty Jew.' Here
I was, a mature, respected professional, at home; some twerp
who didn't know me from Adam, succeeded in terrifying me.
With his words, all the fears, and all the memories, my own and
my mother's and my grandmother's, flooded back, uncontained
and uncontainable. How is it that some anonymous creep could
still terrify me with his words? When I looked down at my hands
they were shaking, and it was not only with rage. I was angry,
but I was also afraid, afraid in my own backyard."6
3. Copy of fall quarter, 1991 course evaluation form on file with the author.
4. Telephone interview with Native American student (name withheld) (March 2,
1992). Flyer on file with the author.
5. Letter from witness (name withheld) to University of Montana President George
Dennison (Feb. 4, 1992). See also letter expressing dismay and regret from President Denni-
son to witness (Feb. 12, 1992) (both letters on file with author).
6. Statement of faculty member, Professor Maxine Van de Wetering, on file with the
author.
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With one exception, these incidents occurred during the last
year at the University of Montana.7
The University of Montana, like universities around the coun-
try, is experiencing a rising tide of racism, sexism, anti-Semitism,
and heterosexism.8 Many universities have sought to understand
the causes of these events with task force studies,9 striving to stem
their tide with educational programs on cultural, ethnic, racial, and
gender diversity. To protect students in target groups"a from this
7. News reports of incidents of hate messages at the University of Montana, and of
responses from members of the university community to those incidents, have appeared in
the local news media. See, e.g., Dave Zelio, Homosexuals Say No to Stereotypes, MONTANA
KAIMIN, May 9, 1991, at 1; Dave Hastings, Dorm Incident Prompts Gay March, MONTANA
KAIMIN, May 10, 1991, at 1; Dave Zelio, Gay Bashing Examined, MONTANA KAIMIN, May 14,
1991, at 1; Dave Zelio, Gays Face Threat of Harassment, MONTANA KAIMIN, May 23, 1991,
at 1; Kathy McLaughlin, 'Nigger' Posters Spur Education Campaign, MONTANA KAIMIN,
Nov. 19, 1991, at 1; Kathy McLaughlin, Dennison Calls Racism on Campus Intolerable,
MONTANA KAIMIN, Nov. 20, 1991, at 1; Karen Coates, Racism Hits Home with Students,
MONTANA KAIMIN, Nov. 21, 1991, at 1; Randi Erickson, Committee Proposes Banning
'Fighting Words' as Counter to Hate Speech, MONTANA KAIMIN, Jan. 8, 1992, at 1; Andrea
Barnett, The Politics of Language, MISSOULA INDEPENDENT, Jan. 24, 1992, at 8.
8. E.g., "A new study by the National Institute Against Prejudice & Violence, a Balti-
more-based research group, documents racial incidents at 250 colleges that occurred since
the fall of 1986." Connie Leslie, et al, Lessons from Bigotry 101, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 25, 1989,
at 48-49. "In the case of gays and lesbians, fear of AIDS has brought homophobia out of the
closet: of 1411 reports of "gay bashing" on college campuses in 1988, 227 were classified as
AIDS related." Nancy Gibbs, Bigots in the Ivory Tower, TIME, May 7, 1990, at 104, 105. For
examples of such incidents see, Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional
Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. UL. REv. 343, 349-58 (1991) [hereinafter Delgado, Campus
Rules]; and Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech
on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 431-34.
I will use the term "heterosexism" to refer to the practice of subordinating persons
based on their sexual orientation. Heterosexism thus refers to the conscious and unconscious
presumption in favor of sexual relationships of mixed gender, the conscious disrespect and
hatefulness toward persons with sexual relationships of the same gender, and the fear of
sexual relationships of the same gender (sometimes termed "homophobia").
9. The University of Montana study, Cultural Diversity at the University of Mon-
tana, 1991, A Ten-Year Plan of Action, stated: "In order to successfully diversify the stu-
dent body it is necessary to change the campus climate. The change includes a campus-wide
shift of attitudes about minority students, the development of appropriate support services,
and increased academic interest in the cultures of under-represented students." Id. at 4.
The report notes, for example, the proportionate underrepresentation of Native American
students on the University of Montana campus: Native Americans are 5.9% of the Montana
population but only 2.4% of the university's student body. Id. at 10.
In 1988, the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System "adopted 'Design
for Diversity,' a plan to increase minority representation, multi-cultural understanding and
greater diversity throughout the University of Wisconsin's 26 campuses. Design for Diver-
sity responded to concerns over an increase in incidents of discriminatory harassment."
UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1164 (E.D.
Wis. 1991).
10. Throughout this essay the term "target groups" refers to groups subordinated be-
cause of race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnic origin. For the sake of style and
convenience, I will not mention all of these groups, or the practices of subordination (such 3
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assaultive and demeaning expression, universities have also
adopted regulations" prohibiting various kinds of hate messages. 2
These regulations have sparked a national debate, raising ques-
tions about the very mission and membership of universities."
Proponents and opponents of regulating campus hate
messages fundamentally disagree over the harm and terror that
such messages inflict1" and the role that they play in reinforcing
racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, and heterosexism. 5 Opponents of
regulating hate messages believe that part of a university's mission
is to encourage speech and debate.'6 Proponents of regulating hate
as racism or sexism) associated with these groups, each time I refer to the targets of hate
messages. I, nonetheless, intend my analysis to apply to members of all of these groups.
11. For examples of such regulations see Robert Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and
the First Amendment, 32 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 267, 268-70, 276-77 (1991); and Lawrence,
supra note 8, at 450-51.
12. Throughout this essay I use the term "hate messages" to refer to all expression
which conveys, intentionally or otherwise, racist, sexist, anti-Semitic, and heterosexist
messages. I reserve the term "hate epithets" to refer to epithets which are directed at indi-
viduals in traditionally subordinated groups (women, African-Americans, Latinos, Jews,
Asian-Americans, gays and lesbians, etc.) and which intentionally demean the target indi-
vidual's membership in the subordinated group or intentionally threaten the target individ-
ual because of membership in the subordinated group. Expressions like "nigger," "spic,"
"kike," "bitch," "faggot," and "dyke" are examples of "hate epithets" as used here. The
term "hate epithets" does not mean expressing views, or discussing ideas, about the respec-
tive groups or their members. Statements like "Women should stay home and have babies,"
"African-Americans are all lazy," or "Gays molest children" are not "hate epithets" as the
term is used here. These statements, which rest on sexist, racist, and heterosexist stereo-
types, are disgusting, but they do not assault target group members quite the way that
epithets like "nigger" do. For a discussion of this distinction see infra text accompanying
notes 44-45.
13. In addition to Delgado, Campus Rules, supra note 8, Lawrence, supra note 8, and
Post, supra note 11, see, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Ra-
cial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 133 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter, Delgado, Words that Wound]; Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Pro-
tected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 287 (1990); Toni Massaro, Equality and Freedom of
Expression: The Hate Spe'ech Dilemma, 32 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 211 (1991); Mari Mat-
suda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2320 (1989); Rodney Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and
Sexist Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171 (1990); and Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484.
14. E.g., Lawrence, supra note 8, at 459. Professor Mari Matsuda, for example, de-
scribes the character and consequences of racist hate. messages:
Racist hate messages, threats, slurs, epithets, and disparagement all hit the gut of
those in the target group. . . .The hate speech flaring up in our midst includes
insulting nouns for racial groups, degrading caricatures, threats of violence, and
literature portraying Jews and people of color as animal-like and requiring ex-
tirmination. . .. From the victim's perspective, [hate messages] inflict wounds,
wounds that are neither random nor isolated.
Matsuda, supra note 13, at 2332-35.
15. Matsuda, supra note 13, at 2326-41.
16. For a detailed statement of opponents' views, see Strossen, supra note 13, at 549-
4
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messages argue that opponents fail to appreciate the depth or ex-
tent of the injuries hate messages cause. They note that rather
than encouraging the robust exchange of ideas, hate messages si-
lence their targets, forcing them to withdraw from campus discus-
sions, programs, and activities to protect themselves from the in-
sult of such messages or the implicit physical threat that they
pose.' 7 Opponents argue that any regulation of hate messages, no
matter what the harm to targets, will chill campus speech and in-
terfere with the university's proper efforts to create a robust mar-
ketplace of ideas. They say that the university should educate
those who deliver hate messages rather than prohibit or regulate
their speech. The university should respond to hate messages with
more, and more forceful, speech and analysis. It must teach toler-
ance, not regulate speech.
In this essay I analyze issues raised by the proposals from the
University of Montana's Student Conduct Code Revision Commit-
tee to regulate hate messages at the university.'" I strongly support
a regulation which prohibits hate epithets at the University of
Montana.' 9 I am not an attorney. Although I have taught Constitu-
tional Law at the Law School with my colleague Professor Larry
Elison for nearly a decade, I shall not attempt in this essay to offer
a thorough evaluation of First Amendment law. I want, rather, to
analyze several issues of campus policy2" and normative jurispru-
dence2' raised by proposals to regulate hate messages. I believe
that an analysis of these issues of policy and jurisprudence should
precede more technical legal discussions. I write as an interested
faculty member and a philosopher whose primary concern is with
the ways that campus hate messages and their regulation affect all
of our students, including women and students of color, our con-
ception of the roles and responsibilities of the university in our
17. Lawrence, supra note 8, at 471.
18. See infra note 24, for the text of the proposed revisions.
19. See infra Part IV, Section C.
20. I use the term "campus policy" to refer to the objectives of campus programs and
the means used to achieve those objectives. For example, the university has an equal educa-
tional opportunity policy. This policy seeks to assure that all persons, regardless of race,
gender, etc., have an equal opportunity to receive an education at the University of Mon-
tana. Recruitment, admissions, and instructional programs, among others, reflect this policy.
Each of these programs uses specific means to assure that all students can enter and succeed
at the university.
21. I use the term "normative jurisprudence" to refer to the study of the character and
structure of the norms which guide a legal system. Our legal system is guided by such norms
as liberty, equality, individual autonomy, prevention of harm, and the provision of public
goods. The structure of these norms-how, for example, priority is determined among them
when they conflict-often guides public policy.
1992]
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community, and our free speech ideals.
Part I of this essay reviews campus free speech debates during
the civil rights and Vietnam War protests and attempts to explain
the current campus opposition to the proposal to regulate hate
messages. Part II identifies and distinguishes the harms of hate
messages, including: (1) the psychological harms to students who
are the targets of hate messages, (2) the denial of equal educational
opportunity to students who are target group members, (3) the im-
pairment of the robust exchange of ideas on campus, and (4) the
perpetuation of such malicious social practices as racism, sexism,
anti-Semitism, and heterosexism. Part III analyzes three concep-
tions of the mission of public schools and universities articulated
by justices of the United States Supreme Court in recent years.
These conceptions offer distinctly different guidance to educators
interested in regulating expression and ideas. Only Justice Black-
mun's conception, in Board of Education v. Pico,22 is sufficiently
sophisticated to afford sensitive guidance to schools and colleges as
they consider regulating hate messages. Finally, Part IV, after re-
viewing two recent federal district court decisions overturning
campus regulations of hate messages at the Universities of Michi-
gan and Wisconsin,23 proposes a regulation of hate epithets for the
University of Montana and suggests other steps that the university
might take to counter the messages of racism, sexism, anti-Semi-
tism, and heterosexism.
I. RECENT CAMPUS FREE SPEECH DEBATES AND CURRENT
OPPOSITION TO REGULATING HATE MESSAGES
At the University of Montana, the proposal of the Student
Conduct Code Revision Committee24 to regulate hate messages has
22. 457 U.S. 853, 875-82 (1982).
23. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) and UMW
Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991). For
a discussion of the pertinence to the proposal of this essay of the recent Supreme Court
opinion in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992), see infra note 148.
24. The proposal is actually three alternative proposals:
The following misconduct is subject to disciplinary action(s): ...
[Alternative 1] Comments, epithets, or other expressive behavior directed at an
individual, or on separate occasions at other individuals, or physical conduct on
University premises or at University-sponsored activities if such comments, epi-
thets, or other expressive behavior or physical conduct intentionally:
(1) Demean the race, sex, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry, marital
status, creed, religion, color, age, or mental or physical disability of a specific indi-
vidual or individuals; and
(2) Create an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment for education, Uni-
versity-related work, or other University-authorized activity.
NOTE: Whether the intent required for misconduct is present shall be deter-
[Vol. 53
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generated considerable heat, and not a small amount of fire, from
members of the campus community and the press. Indeed, most of
those who have spoken publicly have opposed the proposed regula-
tion.25 Given the recent history of campus debates about free
speech, such antagonism is not surprising.26 Anyone who attended
mined by consideration of all relevant circumstances, including the time and place
of the alleged misconduct. Speech, expression, or conduct, however offensive to
the individual to whom it is directed, that affords the individual a reasonable op-
portunity for dialogue or discussion does not constitute misconduct. (Footnote:
Speech, expression, or conduct in a classroom or other academic setting is pre-
sumed to afford an opportunity for discussion or dialogue. The presumption might
be rebutted, for.example, if a student uses the classroom setting to make catcalls
or shout epithets. Faculty or others in charge of the setting should take reasonable
steps to provide an opportunity for discussion or dialogue to respond to offensive
speech.).
[Alternative 2] The use of "fighting words" by students to harass any person(s) on
University premises or at University-sponsored activities [is prohibited].
"Fighting words" are those personally abusive epithets which, when directly ad-
dressed to any ordinary person are, in the context used and as a matter of com-
mon knowledge, inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction whether or not
they actually do so. Such words include, but are not limited to, those terms widely
recognized to be derogatory references to race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual ori-
entation, disability, and other personal characteristics. "Fighting words" consti-
tute "harassment" when the circumstances of their utterance create a hostile and
intimidating environment which the student uttering them should reasonably
know will interfere with the victim's ability to pursue effectively his or her educa-
tion or otherwise to participate fully in University programs and activities.
[Alternative 3] Have no provision attempting to regulate "hate speech."
.25. News reports, editorials, editorial page letters, and guest editorials revealing oppo-
sition to the proposal have appeared in the local news media. Patricia Sullivan, Not-So-Free
Speech, MISSOULIAN, Nov. 20, 1991, at 1; Joe Kolman, Look Up and Say Hi, MONTANA
KAIMIN, Nov. 21, 1991, at 4; Gina Boysun, UM Should Drop the Muzzle, MONTANA KAIMIN,
Jan. 28, 1992, at 4; Michael Mayer, Repression Isn't the Answer to Hate Speech, MONTANA
KAIMIN, Jan. 31, 1992, at 4; Kathy McLaughlin, President Unclear about Hate Speech,
MONTANA KAIMIN, Feb. 19, 1992, at 4; B. Craig Stauber, One Lump, or Two?, MONTANA
KAIMIN, Feb. 19, 1992, at 4; and Karen Coates, ACLU Could Have Case Against Hate
Speech Code, MONTANA KAIMIN, Feb. 21, 1992, at 1.
But see, Woody Kipp, Racism at University of Montana is Just Another Tomahawk
Chop, MISSOULA INDEPENDENT, Nov. 28, 1991, at 6; Thomas Huff, Regulate Hate Speech to
Protect Students, MONTANA KAIMIN, Feb. 7, 1992, at 4; Thomas Huff, Three More Points to
Help Campus Discussion of Hate Speech, MONTANA KAIMIN, Feb. 11, 1992, at 5; George
Dennison, Freedom of Speech has Limits in Civil Society: Try to Prevent Bigotry, MON-
TANA KAIMIN, Feb. 19, 1992, at 5; and Charlotte Morrison, Hate Speech does not Educate,
MONTANA KAIMIN, Feb. 20, 1992, at 5.
Additionally, the news media have reported on public forums discussing hate message
regulation. Patricia Sullivan, Victim's Voice Missing in Hate Speech Debate, MISSOULIAN,
Dec. 3, 1991, at B-1; and Dawn Reiners, Proposed 'Hate Speech' Ban Meets Opposition at
Forum, MONTANA KAIMIN, Feb. 14, 1992, at 1. See also tape recording of the February 13,
1992 public forum on file with the author.
26. Even the Black Students' Union, and Lambda Alliance, the gay rights organiza-
tion, have opposed regulating hate messages, citing the importance of free speech to op-
pressed groups. See Bill Heisel, Black Student Union Changes Direction, Votes Against
Limits on 'Hate Speech' on Campus, MONTANA KAIMIN, March 10, 1992, at 1. Tape of pub-
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universities between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s experienced
the vociferous free speech debates of either the civil rights or the
Vietnam War protest movements or both. Those debates, and the
generous conception of free speech that they engendered, form the
historical backdrop for the current debates about regulating hate
messages.
During the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, certain efforts by those in
power-sheriffs and government officials in the case of the civil
rights movement,2 7 "patriotic" government officials at the local,
state, and national levels in the case of the Vietnam War pro-
tests28-to limit expression of unpopular ideas prompted students
and faculty to analyze the values expressed by the ideal of freedom
of.speech.29 Central to these analyses were attempts to answer the
following questions: Could all forms of political expression claim
protection under the free speech ideal? Did the free speech ideal
protect only "ideas"-their expression and free flow, as the mar-
ketplace of ideas metaphor and the model of speech as civic delib-
eration suggest-or did the free speech ideal also protect speech
which seemed too outrageous and uncivil to claim to be part of the
exchange of political ideas?30
The civil rights and Vietnam War protest activities chal-
lenged, at its roots, the model of free speech as "civic delibera-
tion," which had dominated discussion of free speech since the
early part of this century.31 This model, the model of "citizens sit-
lic forum sponsored by Associated Students of the University of Montana and the Dean of
Students' Office (Feb. 13, 1992) (on file with the author).
27. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) (overturning disturbing the peace convic-
tions of African-American civil rights demonstrators who sat-in at "whites only' lunch
counters).
28. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (overturning conviction for disturbing the
peace by offensive conduct for wearing a jacket emblazoned with the words "fuck the draft"
in a corridor of the Los Angeles County Courthouse).
29. These analyses, which occurred on campuses, focused on off-campus and campus
political protest activity. Another related issue of political expression which drew considera-
ble academic discussion and analysis during the civil rights and Vietnam War protest activi-
ties was civil disobedience. Indeed, once civil disobedience became an essential part of the
civil rights movement, it also became a topic of discussion and analysis on college campuses.
What is civil disobedience, exactly, and how could it be distinguished from revolution?
When, if ever, was civil disobedience justified? Students and faculty reread the standard
authors-Socrates, Jesus, Locke, Jefferson, and Ghandi-with new appreciation and enthu-
siasm. They read carefully Martin Luther King's "Letter from the Birmingham Jail." They
wrestled with the complex relationship of law to morality. They recognized that conscien-
tious lawbreaking is a special and important form of political expression.
30. Kenneth Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the Subor-
dination of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 95, 96-97.
31. Professor Karst has noted:
The influence of the civic deliberation idea on the Supreme Court is visible not
only in the post-World War I "bad tendency" decisions such as Debs v. United
8
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ting around a table, deliberating and exchanging views with the
utmost civility, reasoning together toward the civic truth that
would decide public issues,"" 2-was, as Professor Karst has noted,
particularly "apt for a polity in which virtually all major values are
shared and disagreements mainly concern ways and means. '33 It
was not suitable, however, when major values conflicted as they did
during both the civil rights and Vietnam War movements.
Most campus participants in discussions of off-campus politi-
cal protests at the height of these movements came to believe that
all forms of political speech, no matter how outrageous, offensive,
or uncivil, deserved protection as essential elements of public de-
bate so long as the expression caused no one physical harm. These
campus proponents of a generous free speech principle argued that
those who had power shaped and controlled the concepts used in
public debate and, therefore, those without power had difficulty
finding the concepts necessary for articulating their ideas.34 They
also argued that because those in power, who set the terms of the
debate, defined reason and civility in ways favorable to their con-
tinuing control of the debate, only speech quite consciously outside
the bounds of reason and civility could adequately express either
the force or character of dissidents' views. 5 Vietnam War protests
commonly included, for example, sexually explicit metaphors and
scatological terms.
Protest activities, as they occurred on university campuses
during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, became microcosms of the
larger public protest movements. There were campus rallies, cam-
pus sit-ins, campus draft card burning, campus Viet Cong flags,
peace symbols painted all over campus, and campus speech,
thoughtful and outrageous.3 " Moreover, students organized them-
States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) and Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), but
also in Justice Brandeis's view of the clear-and-present-danger doctrine as creat-
ing an "emergency exception" to the norm of deliberation. Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (concurring opinion).
Karst, supra note 30, at 96 n.7.
32. Karst, supra note 30, at 96.
33. Id. at 97.
34. Id. at 109-16.
35. Indeed, Professor Karst notes:
If you assume that the freedom of speech is designed for reasoned civic discussion,
you may find it easy to conclude that Unreason should be suppressed. And what
kinds of expression do we consign to the category of Unreason? Of course: speech
that rejects the common sense of what "we all know" (where "we" are those who
share the conventional wisdom) ....
Id. at 100.
36. Contrast statements such as "the war in Southeast Asia is an unjust war" with
"make love not war" and "fuck the draft."
1992]
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selves on campus and then joined public demonstrations off cam-
pus, sitting in at lunch counters,37 participating in bus boycotts
and freedom rides, 38 and marching in protest against the Vietnam
War.
Some efforts to silence campus protestors came from those
who governed universities and from citizens. 39 This silencing char-
acteristically began with the claim that the voices of campus
protestors, like the voices off-campus, were not the voices of rea-
son. Because many campus protestors spoke in unconventional
terms, they were branded as uncivilized, savage, disgusting, law-
breaking, offensive, childish, disorderly, and dangerous to campus
order and security. 0
Faculty and administrators at the University of Montana bat-
tled to protect students' rights to express themselves on campus.
They made the free speech arguments described above, pointing
out both the importance of the marketplace of ideas to a demo-
cratic society and the need for political dissidents to express them-
selves in unorthodox and iconoclastic terms. They also argued that
universities should reproduce on campus, insofar as possible, the
free speech of the larger public world, so as to prepare students for
the charged and contentious political life which they would enter
as citizens. Only if students developed, through experience, the ca-
pacity to participate in the disputes that comprise life in a democ-
racy, could the democracy itself survive.
Considering this history, when the University of Montana Stu-
dent Conduct Code Committee proposed regulations prohibiting
certain hate messages, it was not surprising that most faculty and
students immediately rejected the idea as contrary to the capa-
cious principle of free speech forged, in particular, during the civil
rights and Vietnam War protest movements. Despite the demean-
ing and threatening campus incidents described above,"' opponents
of the proposed hate message regulations upheld the idea that free
37. TAYLOR- BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS 272-311 (1988).
38. Id. at 451-91 (1988).
39. In 1967, for example, Lt. Col. Keith Angwin, recently retired faculty member from
the University of Montana Army ROTC program, tried to silence a young professor at the
University of Montana who used the outrageous essay "Student as Nigger" in a freshman
composition class.
40. The most famous court case came from the public schools. See Tinker v. Des
Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), discussed infra in text accompanying notes 85-89
(holding that high school students' wearing of black armbands as Vietnam War protest was
protected by First and Fourteenth Amendments). For an analogous case occurring at a state
college see Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972), discussed infra in text accompanying notes
90-98.
41. See text accompanying notes 1-6.
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speech protects even the most disgusting, offensive, and intolerant
expression.
II. THE HARMS OF HATE MESSAGES
Opponents of campus regulation of hate messages may under-
estimate the depth of the injuries hate messages inflict on their
campus targets and the extent to which hate messages disrupt the
university's educational mission. Such failures of assessment and
judgment may reflect differences in the experiences of those doing
the analyzing. Professor Matsuda directs the attention of those
considering campus regulation of hate messages to the "victim's
story,"4 ' and Professor Charles Lawrence warns that:
Not everyone has known the experience of being victimized
by racist, misogynist, and homophobic speech, and we do not
share equally the burden of the societal harm it inflicts. Often we
are too quick to say we have heard the victims' cries when we
have not; we are too eager to assure ourselves we have exper-
ienced the same injury .... 43
Analysis of campus regulation of hate messages should begin with
an attempt to consider the character and harms of hate messages.
Here the voices of the victims speak with particular authority.
The messages of racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, and heterosex-
ism occur in a variety of forms, ranging from the most obvious and
offensive epithets, such as "nigger," "cunt," "kike," and "fag" to
the more subtle remarks or questions, such as: "Why aren't you
home taking care of your children (to a wage-earning woman)?" or
"Is your son going to be a football player (to an African-Ameri-
can)?144 No matter what form these messages take, however, they
injure campus members of target groups. The messages injure by
demeaning and threatening their targets; they deny target students
equal educational opportunity; they impair the university's educa-
tional programs by silencing their targets, denying members of the
campus community distinctive and important ideas; and they rein-
force, and, thus help to perpetuate, such oppressive social practices
as racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, and heterosexism.
In Part II of this essay, "hate messages" refers to the full
range of hate messages-those aimed at persons on account of
42. Matsuda, supra note 13, at 2321.
43. Lawrence, supra note 8, at 459 (citations omitted).
44. These messages also appear implicitly in expressions of ideas such as: "Affirmative
action programs help lazy or incompetent persons," or "Women need extra support to com-
pete successfully in the workplace."
1992]
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their race, gender, religion, ethnic origin, and sexual orientation.
"Hate epithets," which I propose regulating in Part IV, are a sub-
set of "hate messages." The term "hate epithet" refers to that par-
ticularly assaultive form of hate message that comes in the form of
a disparaging epithet, intentionally aimed at demeaning or threat-
ening target group members. Hate epithets are hate messages
which strike like "a slap in the face."4
A. Producing Psychological Injuries
The first, and most obvious, injury of hate messages is the
demeaning of their targets. " This injury is similar to that for
which the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress seeks
to provide a civil remedy.47 Professor Delgado described this injury
as psychological "feelings of humiliation, isolation, and self-ha-
tred" and doubts about one's "self-worth and identity," ' and
"Professor Patricia Williams has called the blow of racist messages
'spirit murder' in recognition of the psychic destruction victims
experience. ' ' 9
The psychological blows of hate messages have a number of
effects. They undermine their victims' sense of self worth-their
45. Professor Lawrence writes of the experience of hate epithets: "[Bleing called 'nig-
ger,' 'spic,' 'Jap,' or 'kike' is like receiving a slap in the face. The injury is instantaneous."
Lawrence, supra note 8, at 452.
46. See Delgado, Words that Wound, supra note 13, at 143, and Matsuda, supra note
13, at 2332.
47. Professor Delgado proposes an independent tort action for racial insult. Delgado,
Words that Wound, supra note 13. Delgado's proposal served as the inspiration for the
MODEL COMMUNICATIVE TORTS ACT § 6-103 (1989) which recommends recognition of a tort
action for insults based on membership in certain oppressed groups. Jean C. Love, Discrimi-
natory Speech and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 47 WASH. AND
LEE L. REV. 123, 123 n.1 (1990). According to the Model Act, a plaintiff must prove that the
perpetrator: "[I]ntentionally engages in a course of conduct . . . that is addressed to an
individual, that is specifically intended and reasonably likely to harass or intimidate the
individual because of the individual's race, sex, [ethnic origin], or religion, and that directly
causes serious emotional distress." Id. at 123 (quoting MODEL COMMUNICATIVE TORTS ACT
§ 6-103).
Professor Love has argued that § 46 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, which
provides a tort action for causing severe emotional distress, is preferable to MODEL ACT § 6-
103 because it is more inclusive, allowing tort actions for harassment based on such factors
as sexual orientation and even for harassment that does not rest on membership in some
group. Id. at 146.
For another discussion of emotional harms and the ways in which the law of torts tends
to value physical rather than emotional security, see Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber,
Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990).
48. Delgado, Words that Wound, supra note 13, at 137.
49. Matsuda, supra note 13, at 2336-37, citing Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering
the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 127, 139 (1987).
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ability to count themselves and the life they choose to live as valu-
able and their willingness to venture forth confidently into the
public world. 0 They make it difficult for victims to form healthy
inter-racial relationships."1 They probably "affect even the victims'
relationships with members of their own group."52
Hate messages demean most powerfully by evoking the social
practices, such as racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, and heterosexism,
of which the hate messages are a part.53 For example, when "Dez"
Freeman returned to find "nigger" placed on his door, he was
"revictimized" by racism as practiced in the United States against
African-Americans. Racial messages "are different qualitatively
[from simply offensive insults] because they conjure up the entire
history of racial discrimination in this country." '54 They say to the
target individual: "You deserve the degradations that racism in-
flicts."5 Those degradations include segregation, discrimination,
and all of the messages of inferiority that deny the full worth of
racial group members as citizens and as human beings.
Second, hate messages can also injure by frightening and terri-
fying their targets. This injury is analogous to the injury which the
civil action for common law assault recognizes. 6 Hate messages
create apprehension of physical injury, and the perpetrators of
hate messages know that their words carry this threatening mes-
sage. 57 Hate messages do this by eliciting the violent social prac-
tices of which they are a part. 8 For example, because women expe-
rience the pervasive threat of rape, sexist epithets can easily
intimidate and terrify. "Nice tits" or "cunt" demean and trivialize
by reducing women to their sexual anatomy. But these words also
50. Delgado, Words That Wound, supra note 13, at 137-38.
51. Id. at 137.
52. Id.
53. Matsuda, supra note 13, at 2358. For discussion of the ways hate speech perpetu-
ales racism, see infra text accompanying notes 75-78.
54. Delgado, Words that Wound, supra note 13, at 157. See also, Lawrence, supra
note 8, at 453.
55. Indeed, one of the reasons that members of the dominant culture do not fully
appreciate the injuries of racist epithets is that members of the dominant culture analogize
racist epithets to epithets which dominant culture members experience. Such analogies sim-
ply do not work, as Delgado points out, because the epithets aimed at dominant culture
members cannot evoke a hateful social practice the way racist (sexist, anti-Semitic, and
heterosexist) epithets can. Id.
56. Common law assault has been defined as: "The interest in freedom from apprehen-
sion of a harmful or offensive contact with the person, as distinguished from the contact
itself .... No actual contact is necessary to it, and the plaintiff is protected against a purely
mental disturbance of this distinctive kind." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 10 at 43 (5th ed. 1984).
57. Matsuda, supra note 13, at 2335.
58. Id.
1992]
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implicitly threaten rape. 9 When the female teaching assistant re-
ceived the student evaluation form with "though I'd still fuck her"
on it, she felt threatened and scared. a She did not know whether
this anonymous student intended to carry out this threat. She lives
in a world in which rape is commonplace, a fact of which she is
fully aware, and this remark evokes the threat of that world.
The Native American woman who received the racist letter at
married student housing experienced a similar threat. As a woman
of color, she expressed worry about the safety of Native American
children living in married student housing. 1 Those fears reflect in
part the brutal treatment experienced by Native peoples at the
hands of the dominant white culture. An African-American stu-
dent who is called "nigger" may, analogously, experience the threat
of lynchings and beatings,62 which have been so much a part of
racism in the United States.6 3
B. Denying Equal Educational Opportunity
The psychological injuries of hate messages also deny their
targets equal educational opportunity. First, the risk of harass-
ment, and the hostile environment created by the threat of hate
messages, can affect the choices students make about where they
go to college. 4 Recent reports indicate a "mood of apprehension"
among college-bound black students about attending predomi-
nantly white colleges, with some students choosing all-black col-
leges to avoid racial hostility. 5 If fear of the atmosphere on certain
college campuses leads some college-bound women or persons of
color to avoid attending those colleges, then these prospective stu-
dents have been effectively denied an equal educational
opportunity.
59. Massaro, supra note 13, at 255.
60. Notes of interview with Teaching Assistant, University of Montana, in Missoula,
Mont. (December 10, 1991) on file with the author.
61. Telephone interview with Native American student (March 2, 1992) on file with
the author.
62. Massaro, supra note 13, at 255.
63. I have used the term "hate epithet" to refer to intentionally harmful epithets, and
I propose regulating hate epithets defined in this way (see infra text accompanying notes
174-75). I recognize that "ideas" can also be threatening, though I do not believe that it is
constitutionally permissible to regulate ideas (see Part IV, Section B1). Compare the crude
insult "nigger" with "African Americans, like you, cannot appreciate civility and need the
threat of beatings and lynchings to maintain social control." I would regulate the former,
though I consider the latter equally disgusting.
64. Isabel Wilkerson, Racial Harassment Altering Blacks' Choices on Colleges, N.Y.
TIMES, May 9, 1990, at Al.
65. Id.
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Second, studies show that for students of color who do attend
predominantly white colleges, the experience of hate messages and
other forms of discrimination can affect academic performance. 6
The process of education on a university campus requires that stu-
dents participate fully in campus life and in the campus exchange
of ideas, bringing their experiences to bear on their school work.
But a recent study of black students at sixteen predominantly
white colleges by Professor Walter Allen, a sociologist at the Uni-
versity of Michigan, "found that only 12 percent of black students,
as against a majority of white students, said they felt they were an
important part of campus life.""7 By summoning the abhorrent
features of racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, and heterosexism, hate
messages have a uniquely negative effect on the ability of women
and students of color to participate in the campus exchange of
ideas. By not allowing target students the opportunity to express
their experiences, free from psychological injury, hate messages
thus deny these students an essential part of the educational op-
portunity that the university offers.
The threats and harassment Brandon Lahren experienced in
his dormitory room last spring occurred the same week he partici-
pated in a gay pride march on campus. Similarly, "Dez" Freeman
discovered "nigger" tacked to his door shortly after his election as
Knowles Hall president. These students, and other gay and lesbian
and African-American students, may be reluctant to participate
fully in the life of the campus, expressing their views and exper-
iences, if, by doing so, they make themselves vulnerable to such
threatening and demeaning messages. Indeed, Dr. Howard Ehrlich,
the director of the National Institute Against Prejudice and Vio-
lence (a Baltimore research group), notes that the "predominant
reaction [of target students to racial incidents on college campuses]
is withdrawal." 8 Thus, hate messages on campus may deny target
students equal educational opportunity not only by becoming a
factor in the decision where to attend college, but also by causing
such students to withdraw from campus life when these incidents
occur.
C. Disrupting the Robust Exchange of Ideas
The psychological harm of hate messages also deprives mem-
bers of the dominant cultural group of the education that exposure
66. Isabel Wilkerson, Campus Blacks Feel Racism's Nuances, N.Y. TIMES, April 17,
1988, at § 1, Part 1.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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to diverse perspectives and ideas brings. Embracing the principles
of free speech, universities have rightfully protected unpopular,
disagreeable, and, therefore, offensive ideas from the chill of cam-
pus regulation, as opponents of regulating hate messages have
often said. 9 But hate messages which injure minority and women
members of the campus community are more than unpopular and
disagreeable, more than merely offensive. As they threaten, de-
mean, and silence their targets, they also deny everyone on campus
the opportunity to hear the variety of perspectives and ideas of
their targets.7 0 Indeed, student members of target groups cannot
be expected to contribute to campus discussions, bringing their
painful experiences and the perspectives they foster to the campus
exchange of ideas, if they must make themselves vulnerable to the
public harassment and personal injury of hate messages without
the university's protection.
One of the gravest challenges universities face today, as in-
creasing numbers of minority group members and women join
campus life, is how to address the racist, sexist, anti-Semitic, and
heterosexist responses to their presence on campus. Some members
of these groups bring new, formerly absent, voices to campus de-
bates. These new voices appear especially loud, abrasive, and
threatening, because they have not been heard before.7' They may
challenge the views of the dominant culture, views taken for
granted as objective and true. Some members of the dominant cul-
ture on campus may feel uneasy when they experience the chal-
lenge of the perspectives and values of members of previously ex-
cluded groups. The student who wrote "I'd still fuck her" on the
class evaluation form expressed such uneasiness about the teaching
assistant's views and the subject of the course when he said: "The
TA is a feminist opposed to philosophical discussions with a male
she feels is wrong." Students must learn that this uneasiness, these
feelings of threat to conventional values, are the price students
sometimes pay for the enriched understanding which different and
challenging perspectives bring. Being well educated means being
69. See supra text accompanying footnotes 24-41.
70. Lawrence, supra note 8, at 466-72, especially at 471-72; Matsuda, supra note 13, at
2337. See also Post, supra note 11, at 275; Delgado, Campus Rules, supra note 8, at 379;
Roberta M. Hall & Bernice R. Sandier, The Classroom Climate: A Chilly One for Women,
in THE LAW OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 293, 293-96 (J. Ralph Lindgren et al. eds. 1 9 8 8 ); CATHA-
RINE MAcKINNON. TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 205-06 (1989). For particularly
powerful examples of several forms of silencing, see PATRICIA WILLIAMS. THE ALCHEMY OF
RACE AND RIGHTS 44-51 (1991).
71. Kate Bartlett, quoting Daphne Patai of the University of Massachusetts at Am-
herst, calls this phenomenon "surplus visibility." Kate Bartlett, Some Factual Correctness
about Political Correctness, SALT EQUALIZER, Sept. 1991, at 1, 7.
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able to appreciate and respond sensitively to unfamiliar and con-
tradictory values.72
The perspectives and ideas least likely to be exchanged in the
campus marketplace of ideas often come from minority students
and women.73 Students in traditionally subordinated groups are
understandably reticent to speak, precisely because their views,
when expressed openly, often dispute established views. 7 If the
university permits hate messages to silence women and students of
color, the marketplace of ideas will lose one of its most important
commodities-challenging, new ideas.
D. Perpetuating the Practices of Racism, Sexism, Anti-
Semitism, and Heterosexism
Lastly, racist, sexist, anti-Semitic, and heterosexist messages
are as much a part of the institutions of racism, sexism, anti-Semi-
tism, and heterosexism as are racial segregation, rape and sexual
assault, Jew baiting, and gay bashing. Such expressions are an es-
sential part of the message of inferiority each of these practices
seek to convey. These messages are not merely a symptom of ra-
cism, sexism, anti-Semitism, and heterosexism, they are an essen-
tial part of these practices. Professor Delgado has spoken specifi-
cally of the power of racist expression and of its role in sustaining
racism:
The racial insult remains one of the most pervasive channels
through which discriminatory attitudes are imparted. . . . Not
only does the listener learn and internalize the messages con-
tained in racial insults, these messages color our society's institu-
tions and are transmitted to succeeding generations. 75
Matsuda, too, notes the power of racist messages to reinforce and
perpetuate the practice of racism:
[R]acist speech proclaims racial inferiority and denies the per-
sonhood of target group members. All members of the target
group are at once considered alike and inferior.
72. Much of the criticism of so-called "political correctness" seems to miss this point.
White male students may find the atmosphere of the diverse classroom disturbing because
of the challenge to their conventional, culturally dominant views. The question for public
schools and universities is not whether to protect students from such disturbing challenges,
as the critics of political correctness sometimes imply, but how to make these challenges
constructive vehicles for a broadened and deepened education. Indeed, if critics of "political
correctness" coddle those who experience discomfort at new ideas from diverse perspectives,
they will defeat one of the fundamental purposes of the marketplace of ideas in education.
73. Hall & Sandier, supra note 70, at 293-96.
74. Bartlett, supra note 71, at 7.
75. Delgado, Words That Wound, supra note 13, at 135-36.
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• . . Racism is more than race hatred or prejudice. It is the
structural subordination of a group based on an idea of racial in-
feriority. Racist speech is particularly harmful because it is a
mechanism of subordination, reinforcing a historical vertical
relationship.7
The effect of "nigger" on a dorm room door is, thus, larger
than the direct injury to the targeted student. Like the practice of
school segregation, the message is broad and deep, affecting all tar-
get group members and everyone else in society, conveying and
reinforcing the message of racial inferiority."7 Hate messages,
therefore, perpetuate the subordination of target group members,
on and off campus, by reinforcing attitudes regarding the inferi-
ority that membership in the oppressed group entails.
In sum, campus hate messages disrupt the educational mission
of the university. They demean and threaten target students, they
deny students equal educational opportunity, they undermine the
robust exchange of ideas essential to the university's educational
programs, and they reinforce social practices which foster and en-
force relationships of power and subordination on campus. The
university's response to hate messages should acknowledge the
depth and character of the injuries that they inflict and the imbal-
ances of power that they reflect and reinforce."
III. HATE MESSAGES AND THE EDUCATIONAL MISSION OF THE
UNIVERSITY
Proper responses to messages of hate at the University of
Montana require that the university be able to articulate its mis-
sion in society, and its responses to hate messages in terms of that
mission. The university, broadly and loosely, is an educational in-
stitution. The university's authority to pursue its educational mis-
sion implies the authority to regulate speech consistently with that
76. Matsuda, supra note 13, at 2358.
77. Lawrence makes a persuasive case that Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954) was as much about speech as it was about segregation. In Brown, arguably the most
important Supreme Court decision in this century, Lawrence asserts the Court held:
that segregated schools were unconstitutional primarily because of the message
segregation conveys-the message that black children are an untouchable caste,
unfit to be educated with white children. Segregation serves its purpose by con-
veying an idea. It stamps a badge of inferiority upon blacks, and this badge com-
municates a message to others in the community, as well as to blacks wearing the
badge, that is injurious to blacks. Therefore, Brown may be read as regulating the
content of racist speech.
Lawrence, supra note 8, at 439-40 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
78. Matsuda, supra note 13, at 2371.
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mission.79 What is difficult is deciding exactly how the university's
educational mission justifies regulating what speech.
The United States Supreme Court has articulated three differ-
ent conceptions of the educational mission of public schools and
universities which correlate with three conceptions of permissible
regulation of speech. 0 I shall call these, respectively, the "liberal,"
the "conservative," and the "narrow" conceptions of the univer-
sity's educational mission." My purpose in reviewing these three
conceptions of the university's mission is not to provide a detailed
accounting of the relevant law in this area, but rather to extract
from recent Court opinions some principles that inform under-
standing of proper and improper limitations on campus speech.
According to the liberal conception, public schools and univer-
sities are responsible to prepare their students to participate ac-
tively in a democratic society by replicating on campus the "rough
and tumble,"'.2 "hazardous '8 3 freedom of speech characteristically
protected by the First Amendment in the off-campus, public
world. Justice Brennan stated the liberal conception succinctly:
"[The university] is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Na-
tion's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure
to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a
multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authorita-
79. Professor Post has noted: "The [Supreme] Court has always held that 'a univer-
sity's mission is education' and has never construed the first amendment to deny a univer-
sity's 'authority to impose reasonable regulationscompatible with that mission upon the use
of its campus and facilities.' " Post, supra note 11, at 318, citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 267 n.5, 268-69 (1981).
80. Professor Post approaches the problem of regulating campus hate messages by fo-
cusing on the proper roles of schools rather than on doctrinal exceptions to freedom of
speech. Post, supra note 11, at 317-25. The analysis which follows, in Part III of this essay,
owes a debt to the basic insight of this approach.
81. Post describes three, Court-approved, school objectives as:
(1) civic education "[which] conceptualizes instruction as a process of cultural re-
production, whereby community values are authoritatively handed down to the
young";
(2) democratic education "[which] understands the purpose of public [university]
education to be the creation of autonomous citizens, capable of fully participating
in the rough and tumble world of public discourse"; and
(3) critical education "[which] views the university as an institution whose dis-
tinctive 'primary function' is 'to discover and disseminate knowledge by means of
research and teaching.' "
Post, supra note 11, at 319-22 (emphasis added).
The first two of these correspond, respectively, to my "conservative" and "liberal" con-
ceptions of education. The conception I call "narrow" is substantially different from Post's
"critical education."
82. Id. at 321.
83. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
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tive selection.' "84
The liberal conception identifies the preparation of active citi-
zens as the schools' educational mission. This objective, which was
first articulated during the civil rights and Vietnam War protest
movements, supports a generous conception of free speech for
schools and universities. Indeed, achieving this mission requires
that public schools and universities encourage the robust exchange
of ideas on their campuses so that their students may practice the
speech-related citizenship required by a pluralistic society.
The liberal conception is most evident in Justice Fortas' opin-
ion for the Court in Tinker v. Des Moines School District." In
Tinker, Justice Fortas held that a public school could not suspend
high school and junior high school students from school for wear-
ing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War, absent the pres-
ence, or likelihood, of some disturbance or disorder caused by
wearing the armbands. Fortas noted that while the Court had
often affirmed the authority of school officials to control student
conduct, the "problem lies in the area where students in the exer-
cise of First Amendment rights collide with the rules of the school
authorities."8 Justice Fortas asserted that neither "students [nor]
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate," 8 and that these rights create
a "sort of hazardous freedom-[a] kind of openness-that is the
basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of
Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often
disputatious, society." 88
According to the liberal conception of the educational mission
of schools, school officials, though granted certain narrow powers to
regulate to promote order and security, ought to reproduce on
campus the larger world of a democratic society. Schools should
encourage students to participate in the exchange of ideas an open
campus would foster, much as citizens are expected to participate
in the exchange of ideas an open society, required by a democracy,
fosters8 9
The Court extended the reasoning of Tinker in Healy v.
James in 1972.90 In Healy, the Central Connecticut State College
had refused to recognize a chapter of the Students for Democratic
84. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (citations omitted).
85. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
86. Id. at 507.
87. Id. at 506.
88. Id. at 508-09.
89. Post, supra note 11, at 321-22.
90. 408 U.S. 169 (1972)
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Society (SDS) as a campus organization. 1 The college president
denied recognition because he doubted that the local SDS chapter
was independent of the national SDS, which he believed advocated
campus violence and disruption.92 Justice Powell, writing for the
Court, reversed the decision of the court of appeals, which had af-
firmed the district court decision approving the president's denial
of recognition.9 3 Powell remanded the case to the district court for
more careful consideration of the SDS's First Amendment rights. 4
In his opinion, Justice Powell reaffirmed the liberal conception
of the educational mission of schools, applying that conception to a
public college. 5 According to Powell, "the precedents of this Court
leave no room for the view that ... First Amendment protections
should apply with less force on college campuses than in the com-
munity at large." 9' Indeed, if anything, college campuses are "pe-
culiarly" the "marketplace of ideas."97 Powell emphasized this
point by observing that colleges will need to risk campus order, at
least to some extent, to assure the marketplace of ideas:
[T]he wide latitude accorded by the Constitution to the freedoms
of expression and association is not without its costs in terms of
the risk to the maintenance of civility and an ordered society....
Though we deplore the tendency of some [on college campuses] to
abuse the very constitutional privileges they invoke .... we reaf-
firm this Court's dedication to the principles of the Bill of Rights
upon which our vigorous and free society is founded.98
In 1982, as the Court became more conservative, justices be-
gan to disagree over the conception of education which should
91. As a recognized group the SDS would have been able to use various campus facili-
ties. Id. at 174-76.
92. Id. at 174 n.4.
93. Id. at 180.
94. Id. at 174. The SDS brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at
179. The district court first ordered an additional administrative hearing. Id. at 178. The
president of the college reaffirmed his judgment, and the district court then found that the
First Amendment rights of the members of the SDS were not violated. Id. at 179. The cir-
cuit court of appeals, without reaching the First Amendment issues, affirmed the district
court on the ground that the SDS had not exhausted the processes provided and had not
complied with the standards for recognition of campus groups at the college. Id.
95. Id. at 180-81.
96. Id. at 180.
97. Id. (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
98. Healy, 408 U.S. at 194. Justice Brennan made a similar point in Keyishian:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is
of transcendent value to all of us .... That freedom is therefore a special concern
of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of ortho-
doxy over the classroom. "The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is
nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools."
Keyishian, at 603. (citation omitted).
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guide public schools in limiting speech. A new, "conservative" mis-
sion for schools began to emerge. This conception, contrary to
Tinker and Healy, views schools as properly inculcating in their
students fundamental, substantive social, political, and moral val-
ues.9 9 According to this conception, schools may regulate speech, as
necessary, to promote such moral values as decency and civility,
inculcating in their students societal orthodoxies.
The differences between the justices' conceptions of the educa-
tional mission of schools became particularly evident in their re-
spective opinions in Board of Education v. Pico.0 ° In Pico, the
Court faced a dispute over a school board's removal of books the
board considered offensive from a public school library.' °' Students
brought an action claiming that the school board, by removing the
books, 0 12 had denied them their First Amendment rights. The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment in favor of the school
board.0 3 The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for
a trial on the merits of the students' claims. 104 Justice Brennan,
writing for the plurality, affirmed the circuit court's decision0 5 and
reasserted the liberal mission of schools as articulated in Tinker
and Healy:
[J]ust as access to ideas'makes it possible for citizens generally to
exercise their rights of free speech and press in a meaningful
manner, such access prepares students for active and effective
participation in the pluralistic, often contentious society in which
they will soon be adult members.'0 6
• . . '[S]tudents must always remain free to inquire, to study
and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding. 0 7
Writing in dissent in Pico, Justices Burger and Rehnquist ar-
ticulated the newly emerging conservative view, conceiving schools
as properly promoting "respect for authority and traditional val-
99. Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 889 (1982).
100. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
101. Id. at 858.
102. The books included: ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE; ALICE CHILDRESS, A HERO
AIN'T NOTHING BUT A SANDWICH; BERNARD MALAMUD, THE FIXER; ANONYMOUS, Go ASK AL-
ICE; KURT VONNEGUT. JR., SLAUGHTERHOUSE FIVE; LANGSTON HUGHES (ED.), THE BEST SHORT
STORIES BY NEGRO WRITERS; RICHARD WRIGHT, BLACK Boy: and DESMOND MORRIS, THE NA-
KED APE. These books included language the board characterized as either anti-American,
anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, or "filthy." Pico, 457 U.S. at 897-903. (Powell, J., dissenting).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 860.
105. Id. at 875.
106. Pico, 457 U.S. at 868.
107. Id. at 868 (citations omitted).
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ues.''108 This mission for schools substantially enlarged the speech
schools could permissibly regulate.
Justice Burger, writing in Pico, argued:
"'[T]here is a legitimate and substantial community interest in
promoting respect for authority and traditional values be they so-
cial, moral, or political.' " Ante, at 864."09 How are "fundamental
values" to be inculcated except by having school boards make
content-based decisions about the appropriateness of retaining
materials in the school library and curriculum.110
Justice Rehnquist, in a separate dissenting opinion in Pico, con-
ceived the mission of schools similarly:
When it acts as an educator, at least at the elementary and sec-
ondary school level, the government is engaged in inculcating so-
cial values and knowledge in relatively impressionable young peo-
ple .... [1It is "permissible and appropriate for local boards to
make educational decisions based upon their personal, social, po-
litical and moral views."'"
In 1985, this conservative conception influenced Justice Bur-
ger's opinion for the Court in Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser."' In Fraser, the Court upheld school sanctions against a
high school student who gave a speech using strong sexual innu-
endo favoring a friend's election to a student government office." '
Justice Burger elaborated the conservative view:
[S]chools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized
social order. Consciously or otherwise, teachers-and indeed the
older students-demonstrate the appropriate form of civil dis-
course and political expression by their conduct and deportment
in and out of class .... The schools, as instruments of the state,
may determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct
cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or
offensive speech and conduct such as that indulged in by this
confused boy. 1 4
108. Id. at 889. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
109. Although Justice Burger cites the plurality's reference to the school board's brief
here, he does so only to contrast his conception of the school's proper mission with that of
the plurality. The plurality uses this citation to affirm the limitations on the school's mis-
sion provided by the "transcendent imperatives of the First Amendment." Id. at 864.
110. Id. at 889.
111. Id. at 909 (quoting Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300,
1305 (7th Cir. 1980)) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
112. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
113. Id. at 677-80. According to the Court, "During the entire speech, [the student]
referred to his candidate in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor."
Id. at 677-78.
114. Id. at 683.
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Burger reasoned that restrictions on this student's speech were
consistent with the public school's constitutionally proper mission
to " 'inculcat[e] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance
of a democratic political system,' . . [including] 'habits and man-
ners of civility.' ",15
A third conception of the missions of schools also emerged in
Pico." In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun argued that
the educational missions of schools are far more complex than ei-
ther the liberal or conservative conceptions acknowledge. 1 7 Black-
mun rejected the liberal, hazardous freedom approach, because it
fails to recognize that schools, as they pursue their educational
mission, "may seek to instill certain values 'by persuasion and ex-
ample.' ""18 Blackmun also rejected the conservative, inculcation of
values approach, because it permits school officials intentionally to
"shield students from certain ideas that officials find politically
distasteful."'" 9
Blackmun stated the two conflicting missions of schools, as he
understood them:
On the [one] hand, as the plurality demonstrates, it is be-
yond dispute that schools and school boards must operate within
the confines of the First Amendment .... [S]chools, like other
enterprises operated by the State, may not be run in such a man-
ner as to "prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, national-
ism, religion, or other matters of opinion" . . . On the [other]
hand .... public schools [are important] "in the preparation of
individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of
the values on which our society rests." Because of the essential
socializing function of schools, local education officials may at-
115. Id. at 681. (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979), and C. BEARD
& M. BEARD. NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)). It is not, of course,
certain whether the Court would apply the conservative principles of Pico and Fraser to
higher education. As Professor Post notes, however, there is reason to believe it might. Post,
s opra note 11, at 322. Post points out that in an earlier dissenting opinion in Papish v.
University of Missouri Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973), Chief Justice Burger made such an
argument:
In theory, at least, a university is not merely an arena for the discussion of ideas
by students and faculty; it is also an institution where individuals learn to express
themselves in acceptable, civil terms. We provide that environment to the end
that students may learn the self-restraint necessary to the functioning of a civi-
lized society and understand the need for those external restraints to which we
must all submit if group existence is to be tolerable.
Papish, at 672. Post, supra note 11, at 322.
116. Pico, 457 U.S. at 875-82. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 876-77.
118. Id. at 882. (Blackmun, J., concurring)(quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943)).
119. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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tempt "to promote civic virtues .. 122
As Blackmun saw it, a "delicate accommodation [must be made]
between . . . the schools' 'inculcative' function [and] the First
Amendment's bar on 'prescriptions of orthodoxy.' "121 Blackmun
noted, with specific reference to the choice of books, that:
[A] tension exists between the properly inculcative purposes of
public education and any limitation on the school board's abso-
lute discretion to choose academic materials. But that tension
demonstrates only that the problem here is a difficult one, not
that the problem should be resolved by choosing one principle
over another.'22
Blackmun proposed what he called a "narrow" principle to
guide educators making academic program decisions such as choos-
ing books.'23 According to this narrow principle, "school officials
must have the authority to make educationally appropriate
choices,' 1 24 but school officials may not, in making those choices,
protect students from ideas that officials find politically or morally
disagreeable. This principle accepts that "if educators intentionally
... eliminate all diversity of thought, the school will 'strangle the
free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important
principles of our government as mere platitudes.' "'25 But it also
accepts that schools, consistently with their mission, may, and in-
deed will, limit some ideas and promote other ideas. 2 ' Even the
refusal "to allow discussion of current events in Latin class is a
policy designed to 'inculcate' Latin .... ",127 But, and this is cru-
cial, such promoting and limiting of ideas may not flow simply
from school officials' approval or disapproval of the ideas in ques-
tion. 28 School officials must show that they had something in
120. Id. at 876 (citations omitted).
121. Id. at 879.
122. Id. at 881-82.
123. Id. at 880. The term "narrow" can be misleading. Blackmun intends the term to
distinguish school regulation of speech, narrowly tailored to serve specific educational pro-
gram decisions, from the broad, but singleminded, conceptions of school regulation of
speech of the liberal and conservative views. The term "narrow" does not mean schools may
regulate speech for a single narrow purpose, but rather for various narrow purposes related
to particular educational objectives.
124. Id. at 882.
125. Id. at 879 (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637
(1943)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 881.
128. The Court reaffirmed this point in Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260 (1987). The Court held that the school principal, when he exercised editorial control
over the contents of the student newspaper, did not abridge First Amendment rights of
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mind, as they regulate expression, consistently with the mission of
schools, apart from the "mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint ... 12
Of his narrow principle, Blackmun said:
In my view, we strike a proper balance here by holding that
school officials may not remove books for the purpose of restrict-
ing access to the political ideas or social perspectives discussed in
them, when that action is motivated simply by the officials' disap-
proval of the ideas involved .... [T]he board [must have] some-
thing in mind in addition to the suppression of partisan or politi-
cal views it did not share.
... First Amendment principles would allow a school board
to refuse to make a book available to students because it contains
offensive language, or because it is psychologically or intellectu-
ally inappropriate for the age group . ..."0
Thus, the judgments required by this approach, according to
Blackmun, inevitably require a "delicate accomodation" between
the school's educational mission and First Amendment values.' 3 '
If the University of Montana follows the liberal conception of
the mission of a university, with the hazardous world of the public
domain reproduced on campus, I believe it would be difficult for
the university to justify regulating any hate messages. The targets
of such messages would simply have to carry a special, heavy bur-
den of this hazardous freedom."l 2 If, on the other hand, the Uni-
versity of Montana follows the conservative conception of the mis-
sion of schools as promoting "fundamental social, political, and
moral values," I believe it would be quite easy to justify regulating
student writers. Id. at 273. The Court said: "(E]ducators do not offend the First Amend-
ment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns." Id.
129. Pico, at 880 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
(1969)).
130. Id. at 879-80 (emphasis in original)(citations omitted).
131. Id. at 879. Professor Jocelyn Siler, in a memorandum to members of the Univer-
sity of Montana Faculty Senate about the Student Conduct Code Committee proposals to
regulate hate speech, wrote:
[Uinfortunately, or perhaps fortunately, there are no absolutes. The slippery slope
is where we carry on our daily lives, and the more moral we are, the more often we
actively recognize our place on that incline, questioning our own actions, our own
sensitivity to the complicated power relationships that we are part of.
Memorandum from Professor Jocelyn Siler to the Montana Faculty Senate Members
(March 13, 19 92)(on file with the author).
132. Lawrence, supra note 8, at 472.
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hate messages.1 1 3 Hate messages are thoroughly vile, and the uni-
versity would surely meet the objective of "inculcating habits and
manners of civility" if it prohibited not just hate epithets, but all
hate messages as well. If the university followed this conception,
however, I believe the university would lose the more generous
principles of free speech, which it fought for and won during the
protest movements of recent decades. Regulation of hate messages,
together with other forms of offensive speech, would be too easy,
and the cost to campus free speech would be high.
Justice Blackmun's narrow principle, however, rejects the sin-
glemindedness of both the liberal and conservative conceptions of
the mission of the university. His principle calls for the university
to regulate speech in a manner consistent with, and pertinent to,
the respective educational decisions the university makes to
achieve its overall educational mission. Justice Blackmun's narrow
principle thus rejects the notion that the university should regulate
speech to realize only the liberal or only the conservative policies.
According to Blackmun's principle, campus officials must ask, as
they regulate campus speech, what educational objectives will be
served, whether those educational objectives impermissibly protect
students from ideas officials find distasteful, and whether those
educational objectives unduly burden First Amendment, free
speech values. Blackmun's principle offers no simple formula for
balancing these concerns. Indeed, it deliberately avoids the simple
formulas suggested by the liberal and conservative conceptions.
IV. REGULATING HATE MESSAGES AND THE UNIVERSITY'S MISSION
The prevalence of hate messages at the University of Montana
is alarming. At a time when the university is attempting to in-
crease the diversity of its student body and enrich its curriculum
to include the broadest range of perspectives present in the nation
and the world,' hate messages teach "[liessons of cynicism and
hate which replace [the] lessons in critical thought and inquiry"'35
the university is trying to convey. Any attempt by the university to
regulate hate messages of any sort, however, faces two problems:
First, the university needs to decide whether to regulate these
messages under existing exceptions to free speech doctrine, 3 ' suit-
ably expanded, or whether to single out regulated campus hate
133. See Post, supra note 11, at 320.
134. UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA REPORT, supra note 9, at 4.
135. Matsuda, supra note 13, at 2371. See Part I1, supra.
136. Such as the "fighting words" exception.
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messages for special treatment.137 This decision requires attention
to the requirement of Justice Blackmun's principle that speech
regulation should receive special treatment in the educational envi-
ronment of a university. Second, the university needs to distin-
guish clearly between those hate messages it proposes to regulate
and those hate messages it believes are protected by free speech
doctrine.' 3 This distinction requires what Justice Blackmun called
the "delicate accommodation between ... the [university's] 'incul-
cative' function [and] the First Amendment's bar on 'prescriptions
of orthodoxy.' ",139 Two attempts to regulate campus hate messages
at the Universities of Wisconsin and Michigan, held unconstitu-
tional by federal district courts, 140  demonstrate these two
problems.
A. Two Recent Efforts to Regulate Hate Messages
1. Special Treatment for Hate Messages
The University of Montana will first need to decide whether to
single out regulated hate messages for special treatment Under the
First Amendment or whether to regulate under existing exceptions
to free speech doctrine."4 Efforts to regulate hate messages in the
University of Wisconsin system under existing free speech excep-
tions reveal the importance of this decision.
The Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System,
in an effort to increase minority representation and multi-cultural
understanding on its twenty-six campuses, in 1988 adopted a plan,
"Design for Diversity."' 42 To implement the diversity plan, the
Board enacted a student conduct code provision prohibiting speech
which intentionally demeaned persons based on their race, sex, re-
ligion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation, national origin,
ancestry or age and which created "an intimidating, hostile, or
137. UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163
(E.D. Wis. 1991)(explaining overbreadth of university's rule prohibiting students from di-
recting racist or discriminatory comments at individuals).
138. See Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 861-62 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
139. Pico, 457 U.S. at 879.
140. UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163
(E.D. Wis. 1991), and Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
141. This special treatment could mean a new exception to free speech doctrine, as
Professor Matsuda suggested (supra note 13, at 2356-61), or it could mean special treatment
within the context of the university's authority to regulate to achieve its educational mis-
sion, as Justice Blackmun's principle recommends. See supra text accompanying notes 116-
31.
142. UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163,
1164 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
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demeaning environment for education. 1' 4 3 In March 1990, a stu-
dent newspaper, the UWM Post, and others challenged the provi-
sion in federal district court. In defending its provision, the board
asked the court to expand the "fighting words" exception'44 to the
First Amendment to accommodate its provision, or to find the pro-
vision consistent with the exception implicit in Title VII law re-
garding sexual and racial harassment in the workplace.1 45
The district court rejected these arguments. The court found
the UW rule too broad for the fighting words doctrine, because it
''covers a substantial number of situations where no breach of the
peace is likely to result ... "146 The court also found Title VII
inappropriate both because the UW regulations applied to educa-
tion, not employment, and because students are not agents of the
university in the way that employee supervisors are agents of their
employers." 7
The University of Wisconsin Board's argument that a court
should expand an existing free speech exception poses two risks.
First, a court may refuse, as it did in that case. Second, if the court
accepts the Board's invitation to expand an existing free speech
exception, not narrowly suited to the special harms of hate
messages in a university setting, there can be dilution of free
speech principles. Indeed, if the fighting words doctrine expands,
as the board proposed, to include hate messages not likely to cause
a breach of the peace, courts may have difficulty distinguishing
hate messages from other forms of offensive speech the university
should protect. As Professor Matsuda has noted, "This stretching
ultimately weakens the first amendment fabric, creating ... holes
that remove protection for many forms of speech."' 4
143. Id. at 1165. A complete statement of the rule can be found in the opinion at pp.
1165-66.
144. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Chaplinsky held that:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the preven-
tion and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or "fighting" words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
Id. at 571-72.
145. UWM Post, at 1169.
146. Id. at 1173. The district court also found the balancing test in the fighting words
doctrine "not proper" because the UW rule regulated speech based upon its content while
the balancing test had been applied by the Supreme Court only to non-content regulation of
speech which breaches, or is likely to breach, the peace. Id. at 1174.
147. Id. at 1177-78. The court also found the rule unconstitutionally vague because it
failed to make clear "whether the speaker must actually create a hostile educational envi-
ronment or if he must merely intend to do so." Id. at 1179.
148. Matsuda, supra note 13, at 2357. Use of an existing free speech exception could
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Hate messages injure campus targets and concomitantly jeop-
ardize the university's educational program. To the extent the uni-
versity regulates any hate messages, its regulations should focus, I
also create another problem for campus regulation of hate speech. The United States Su-
preme Court may find attempts by universities to regulate hate messages under such well-
defined exceptions as "fighting words" impermissible, following its reasoning in the recently
decided R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
In the only case to reach the Supreme Court directly involving current efforts to regu-
late hate messages, the Court addressed a St. Paul, Minnesota "Bias-Motivated Crime Ordi-
nance." This ordinance prohibited "plac[ing] on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi
swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm, or re-
sentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender .... Id. at 2541. The
City charged the petitioner, R.A.V., with violating the ordinance by burning a cross on an
African-American family's lawn. The trial court dismissed the charge on the grounds that
the ordinance was overbroad and content-based, but the Minnesota Supreme Court re-
versed, construing the ordinance, consistently with earlier state cases, to reach only "fight-
ing words" and thus found it not overbroad. In re R.A.V., 464 N.W. 2d 507, 511 (Minn.
1991) (en banc). The lower court ruled the ordinance was not impermissibly content-based
because "the ordinance is a narrowly tailored means toward accomplishing the compelling
governmental interest in protecting the community against bias-motivated threats to public
safety and order- .. " Id.
Justice Scalia, writing for a five-justice majority, conceded that the Court was bound by
the Minnesota Supreme Court's construction of the ordinance as prohibiting "fighting
words." 112 S. Ct. at 2542. Rather than finding the ordinance substantially overbroad, as the
four concurring justices did, Justice Scalia assumed arguendo that the ordinance only
reached expression proscribable under the "fighting words" doctrine. Justice Scalia con-
cluded, however, "that the ordinance is facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits other-
wise permitted speech solely on the basis of the [content of] the speech- .. " Id. Following a
free speech theory which Justice White described as "untried" and "transparently wrong,"
id. at 2551, Justice Scalia concluded that although the Court assumed the expression pro-
scribed by the St. Paul ordinance fell within the well-defined and narrowly limited "fighting
words" category-a category constitutionally proscribable because of its content-the ordi-
nance was nonetheless facially unconstitutional because it discriminated within the "fight-
ing words" category in a constitutionally proscribable manner. Id. at 2547-48. According to
Justice Scalia, even if the Court assumed that the St. Paul ordinance reached only "fighting
words," the ordinance discriminated among "fighting words" based on hostility to the con-
tent of those words. The ordinance thus impermissibly discriminated against speech based
on its content.
The Court's ruling in R.A.V. suggests the University of Montana should avoid any at-
tempt to regulate hate messages under well-defined categories of constitutionally proscrib-
able speech such as "fighting words." Indeed, if the university avoids such categories, regu-
lating hate messages according to Justice Blackmun's principle in Pico (concentrating on the
harms of hate epithets to target students, to equal educational opportunity, and to the uni-
versity's educational mission), then the reasoning of the Court in R.A.V. focused as it is on
the well-defined categories of proscribable speech, would be off point.
Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence in R.A.V., suggested, however, that the Court may
have "been distracted from its proper mission by the temptation to decide the issue over
'politically correct speech' and 'cultural diversity.' . . ." Id. at 2561. (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring). See supra, note 72. If, as Justice Blackmun implied, the opinion of Justice Scalia for
the five-member majority reflected an unprincipled hostility to hate message regulation in
general and an insensitivity to the special harms of hate messages, then no campus regula-
tion of hate messages, no matter how designed, will be safe from the majority's wrath.
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believe, on the injuries of hate messages to campus targets, 49 on
the way those injuries deny targets equal educational opportu-
nity, 5' and on the way those injuries silence targets, thus under-
mining the robust exchange of ideas on campus.15' This would
place the purpose of the regulation narrowly within the univer-
sity's mission as an educational institution, as Justice Blackmun's
principle advised, and it would avoid trying to place the regulation
within the purpose of an established doctrinal exception to free
speech. To accomplish this, the university needs a "non-neutral,
value-laden approach"' 52 to regulation, clearly focused on the spe-
cific harms of hate messages in the university. This requires, as
Professor Matsuda has noted, that regulated hate messages on
campus be "treated as a sui generis category,"''53 not as an exten-
sion of some other category like fighting words.
2. Distinguishing Regulated Hate Messages
After experiencing many racist, sexist, anti-Semitic, and heter-
osexist incidents similar to those that have occurred at the Univer-
sity of Montana, the University of Michigan (unlike the University
of Wisconsin) tried to single out hate messages for special treat-
ment. The University of Michigan's effort, however, reveals the
second problem the University of Montana will face if it attempts
to regulate any hate messages-how to distinguish clearly those
hate messages it proposes to regulate from those hate messages it
believes are protected by free speech doctrine.
In 1987, prompted by appalling campus incidents and by en-
suing political pressure, the University of Michigan adopted an
anti-discrimination disciplinary policy.'54 This anti-discrimination
policy'55 included a regulation which prohibited: "Any behavior,
149. See supra text accompanying notes 46-63.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 64-68.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 69-74.
152. Matsuda, supra note 13, at 2357.
153. Id.
154. For a detailed history of the University of Michigan's efforts to write this policy
see Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 853-56 (E.D. Mich. 1989) and G.S.
Siegel, Comment, Closing the Campus Gates to Free Expression: The Regulation of Offen-
sive Speech at Colleges and Universities, 39 EMORY L.J. 1351, 1357-66 (1990) (hereinafter
Closing the Gates).
155. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 856-57. A full statement of the policy and associated proce-
dures can be found in the opinion at pp. 856-58. The Acting President of the university,
speaking in a memorandum proposing the policy, makes its breadth clear: "[SItudents at a
university cannot by speaking or writing discriminatory remarks which seriously offend
many individuals beyond the immediate victim, and which, therefore detract from the nec-
essary education climate of a campus, claim immunity from a campus disciplinary proceed-
ing [by appealing to rights of freedom of speech]." Id. at 855.
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verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on
the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed,
national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam-
era veteran status ... ."156
A graduate student challenged the regulations in federal dis-
trict court arguing that the regulation's "vagueness and over-
breadth chilled speech and conduct in violation of the first amend-
ment .... ,,,57 The district court found the regulation substantially
overbroad. 158 This was evidenced, the court said, both by the lan-
guage of the regulation which "swe[pt] within its ambit a substan-
tial amount of protected speech along with that which it may legit-
imately regulate," 159 and by the university's own application of the
policy to reach protected speech on a number of occasions.1 60
The court also found the regulation vague. In analyzing the
charge of vagueness, the court found that "Looking at the plain
language of the Policy, it was simply impossible to discern any lim-
itation on its scope or any conceptual distinction between pro-
tected and unprotected [speech]."'' The court found the terms
"stigmatize" and "victimize" in the regulation unclear and impre-
cise. "'62 According to the court, "the fact that a statement may vic-
timize or stigmatize an individual does not, in and of itself, strip it
of protection Under the accepted First Amendment tests.' 1 63 The
court found the primary defect in the University of Michigan's pol-
icy to be "its inability to distinguish between constitutionally pro-
tected and unprotected speech."'6 4 The court made clear, exactly
as Justice Blackmun's principle requires, that a university may not
establish "an anti-discrimination policy which [has] the effect of
prohibiting certain speech because it disagreed with ideas or
messages sought to be conveyed, . . [or because the speech is]
offensive, even gravely so, [to] large numbers of people. '" 5
If the University of Montana attempts to regulate any hate
messages, I believe it must distinguish hate messages expressing
racist, sexist, anti-Semitic, and heterosexist ideas, which current
free speech doctrine probably will require that it leave unregu-
156. Id. at 856.
157. Closing the Gates, at 1366.
158. Doe, at 866.
159. Id. at 864.
160. Id. at 864-66.
161. Id. at 867.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Closing the Gates, supra note 154, at 1373.
165. Doe, at 863.
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lated, from the hate messages that it proposes to regulate. If the
university fails to make this distinction clearly, its regulation will
be vulnerable to the sort of challenge the University of Michigan's
regulation faced.
B. Addressing Hate Messages at the University of Montana
The University of Montana should, I believe, respond to hate
messages on campus in two ways. First, and most importantly, the
university should respond to all hate messages, those it regulates
and those it must leave unregulated, with educational programs fo-
cused on the character and malevolence of subordinating practices
such as racism, sexism, anti-Semitism and heterosexism. Second,
the university should explicitly prohibit, in a Student Conduct
Code regulation, a narrow class of hate messages-those hate
messages which come in the form of the most despicable, inten-
tionally harmful epithets.
1. Responding to Hate Messages with Education
A necessary and essential part of a contemporary public uni-
versity's mission includes education about such practices as racism,
sexism, anti-Semitism, and heterosexism. 66 Students should have
the opportunity to learn the history, sociology, and psychology of
these practices. Students should also have the opportunity to dis-
cuss and understand the political forces which shape and enforce
these pernicious attitudes and institutional structures in our soci-
ety.'67 Students should learn, for example, that expressions like
166. Mary K. Rouse, Dean of Students of the University of Wisconsin-Madison,
speaks of three essential elements of an effective strategy for changing the climate on cam-
pus for subordinated group members. Rouse also identifies the percentage of effort each
element requires:
(1) Establish standards of interpersonal relationships for students, faculty, and
staff and articulate the kind of university community in which we want to live. In
the simplest and most important terms, the hallmark of the community we yearn
for is respect. (Setting and articulating community standards is 30 percent of our
strategy.)
(2) Increase dramatically our efforts to educate our students about the beauty of
diversity and the pain of racism. This is the critical step. (Education about diver-
sity is 68 percent of our strategy.)
(3) Identify conduct which so grossly and intentionally violates the standards we
have articulated about respect among students that we must use University disci-
plinary action to protect one individual from the intentional efforts of another to
interfere with the victim's University education .... (Discipline is 2 percent of our
strategy.)
Mary K. Rouse, The Two Percent Solution, THE WOMEN'S REVIEW OF BOOKS, Feb. 1992, at
17.
167. For a discussion of the broad range of subordinating behaviors universities should
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"girl" trivialize women in a manner analogously to the way epi-
thets like "cunt" and "tits" reduce women to sex objects. Students
should have the opportunity to learn that the sexual objectification
of women occurs in hateful epithets, in public advertising, in the
workplace, and in much pornography.
Such education can inform everyone in the campus commu-
nity about the variety, character, and wickedness of subordinating
behavior. Subordinated group members may become better in-
formed about the forces that injure them, and may be empowered
to respond more forcefully to the messages of subordination. Dom-
inant group members may come to recognize how everything from
assaults to jokes and unthinking remarks can contribute to the
message of subordination.
Regulation cannot accomplish this education. Regulation fo-
cuses too narrowly on individual incidents. It informs only by set-
ting limits. Moreover, any effort to regulate expression or discus-
sion of all racist, sexist, anti-Semitic, and heterosexist messages
will probably sweep too broadly, prohibiting ideas and attitudes
likely to be protected by First Amendment doctrine. The district
court noticed and rejected this feature of the regulation at the Uni-
versity of Michigan.
Expression and discussion of racist, sexist, anti-Semitic, and
heterosexist ideas on campus will not, however, be without cost to
target group members. The university can demonstrate its sensitiv-
ity to those costs, by the nature, extent, and sincerity of the educa-
tional programs it develops. These programs must include hiring
more women and minority teachers who might add important new
perspectives to the marketplace of ideas on campus; bringing more
speakers to campus to address the character, causes, and harms of
these poisonous social practices; and developing a curriculum that
celebrates the cultures of target group members.
3. Responding to Hate Messages with Regulation
The University of Montana should also single out intention-
ally harmful epithets for "special treatment."'68 To accomplish this
the university's regulation must draw a line on the continuum of
injurious hate messages between campus expression of the more
heinous epithets and constitutionally protected expression and dis-
cussion of racist, sexist, anti-Semitic, and heterosexist ideas. By fo-
address, see Katharine T. Bartlett & Jean O'Barr, The Chilly Climate on College Cam-
puses: An Expansion of the "Hate Speech Debate," 1990 DUKE L.J. 574.
168. Matsuda, supra note 13, at 2357.
[Vol. 53
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cusing on the name-calling, assaultive character of hateful epithets,
the university can, I believe, distinguish such speech with sufficient
clarity to avoid the risk of including in its regulation ideas pro-
tected by First Amendment doctrine.
Moreover, by focusing on the specific damage hate epithets do
to the university's educational mission, the university can avoid
the risks posed, respectively, by the liberal and conservative con-
ceptions of the university's mission. The university would be pro-
scribing hate epithets not because it finds the ideas implicit in the
epithets objectionable, though it does find them objectionable, but
rather because epithets harm students, interfere with the robust
exchange of ideas on campus, and deny students equal educational
opportunity. At the same time the regulation, narrowly focused on
the intentional harms of the most odious and assaultive hate epi-
thets, interferes little with the robust exchange of ideas and the
encouragement of active citizenship at the heart of the liberal
conception.
All hate messages silence their campus targets, truncating the
robust exchange of ideas on which the campus depends to meet its
fundamental educational goals. All hate messages discourage cam-
pus targets from expressing their ideas, denying target group mem-
bers the educational opportunity of having their ideas considered
and challenged. Hate messages also attack many of their campus
targets when they are especially vulnerable-when they are away
from their supportive homes and communities, and at a time in
their lives when they are seeking to understand and achieve their
own identities.'69 Moreover, hate messages on campus victimize
students when they have few avenues of escape from a campus
which serves as a focal point for their education.' 7 ° Each of these
harms of hate messages frustrates the university's central educa-
tional mission. As Professor Matsuda notes, "Official tolerance of
[hate messages] in this setting is more harmful than generalized
tolerance in the community-at-large."'' Regulating hate epithets
could reduce the most heinous and destructive forms of hate mes-
sage on campus. Indeed, precisely because hate epithets prevent
the university, most dramatically and visibly, from achieving its
goals of inclusion and education I believe the university should
prohibit them.'72
The University of Montana has always been a special place in
169. Matsuda, supra note 13, at 2370 n.249.
170. Id. at 2372; Lawrence, supra note 8, at 456.
171. Matsuda, supra note 13, at 2371 (emphasis added).
172. Id.
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the state of Montana. The university has prided itself on the
strength of its instructional program, on its awareness of the needs
of Montana students, on the high quality of its academic commu-
nity, on its openness to new perspectives, and on its willingness to
challenge conventional ideas. The university's students depend "on
the university for community, for intellectual development, and for
self-definition."' 73 The university has sought to meet the needs of
its students with a rich and diverse academic program, with sensi-
tive academic and non-academic advising systems, with the sup-
port of campus housing and food services, with remedial and hon-
ors programs, and with non-academic events. All hate messages
undermine these efforts by the university to serve its students and
thus to realize its educational mission. Prohibiting the most egre-
gious of these messages-hate epithets-would express to all cam-
pus members the university's sensitivity to the harms such
messages can do.
C. The Regulation
A regulation for the University of Montana, narrowly focused
on hate epithets, should include three elements: 74
First, the restricted epithets must be directed at individuals
in traditionally subordinated groups. These must be the sorts of
groups that continue to suffer from societal discrimination. Afri-
can-Americans, Latinos, Asian-Americans, Native Americans,
Jews, women, gay men and lesbians would be the most obvious
instances.
This first provision limits the prohibited messages to messages that
evoke and perpetuate the special harms to subordinated group
members.
Second, the restricted hate messages must come in the form
of a hate epithet which intentionally demeans or threatens a tar-
get individual's membership in the traditionally subordinated
group.
This second provision protects racist, sexist, anti-Semitic, or heter-
osexist ideas but leaves unprotected the hateful epithet intended
to harm others.
Third, the epithet must occur in the classroom where the
173. Id. at 2371.
174. Matsuda proposes that regulations focus on speech in which: "1. The message is
of racial inferiority; 2. The message is directed against a historically oppressed group; and 3.
The message is persecutorial, hateful, and degrading." Id. at 2357.
192' [Vol. 53
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demeaning or threatening epithet will undermine the free ex-
change of ideas essential to the university's mission or the re-
stricted epithet must occur in either a dorm or at a university
sponsored activity where the target individual is vulnerable.
This third provision avoids interfering with traditional public fo-
rums on the university campus while expressing the university's
concern for students of color and women where they are most vul-
nerable, or where they will not be able to express themselves and
the campus will not be able to hear their voices. '75
Three other features of a university hate epithet regulation
would also be important. First, a preface should be included which
states the harms of hate messages and expresses the purpose of the
regulation in terms of the university's mission:
Hate epithets are inimical to the traditions and fundamental
values of higher education. Universities treasure both the open
and robust exchange of ideas and equal educational opportunity.
We encourage all to say what is on their minds in the pursuit of
truth. However, hate epithets demean and threaten their victims
in particularly destructive ways, and they interfere with the ex-
change of ideas. They tend to silence target individuals, forcing
them to withdraw from the open exchange of ideas. They also cre-
ate a hostile educational environment denying their targets a fair
opportunity to benefit from the education we offer. Hate epithets
are, thus, in conflict with the fundamental values of higher educa-
tion, and, as narrowly defined in this regulation, are prohibited at
the University of Montana.
Second, consistently with the university's educational mission,
a first hate epithet violation should place the perpetrator on pro-
bation, requiring participation in a mutually agreed upon educa-
tional program, rather than making the perpetrator subject to
more drastic university action, such as suspension or expulsion.
This will express the university's sympathy with the targets of hate
epithets upon the first incident, while preserving an opportunity to
educate the hate message perpetrator regarding the injuries that
he or she inflicts. It will also allow the university to protect target
group members from anyone who persists in inflicting harm with
such expressions upon a second hate epithet incident.
Finally, the university should make clear that it is establish-
ing, in addition to its regulation, substantial new courses and pub-
175. Lawrence would extend these protections beyond dorms and classrooms to all
common areas of a university campus. Lawrence, supra note 8, at 456-57. But see Smolla,
supra note 13, at 207. The position taken here treats the common areas of the campus as
designated public forums requiring tolerance of hate epithets.
19921
37
Huff: Addressing Hate Messages at the University of Montana
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1992
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
lic programs addressing the nature and injuries of these pernicious
practices.17 Students should not leave campus with the univer-
sity's endorsement, unless the university is certain that they un-
derstand, better than when they came to campus, the subtle and
pervasive problems which these forms of oppression and subordi-
nation create.
V. CONCLUSION
Professor Patricia Williams writes:
At a faculty meeting once, I raised several issues: racism among
my students, my difficulty in dealing with it by myself, and my
need for the support of colleagues. I was told by a white professor
that "we" should be able to "break the anxiety by just laughing
about it." Another nodded in agreement and added that "the key
is not to take this sort of thing too seriously.' 77
The University of Montana, like other institutions in our soci-
ety, has an obligation to take seriously the curse of racism ' s and
each of the other practices of subordination that devastate our col-
lective lives.1 7 9 By the middle of the next century, more than half
the people in the United States will be people of color. More than
half the people in the United States are now women. Whether we
end up Balkanized, like some of the newly emerging nations of the
former Soviet empire, or we fulfill our enduring promise of fair op-
portunity in a pluralistic society, will depend on how we act today.
I no longer believe that we can allow the injuries and the divisive-
ness of hate messages to poison the atmosphere of our university.
If we are educating future generations, we must set the example of
176. This idea was suggested to the author by Sue Bradford, a University of Montana
student.
177. PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 166 (1991).
178. Post, supra note 11, at 267.
179. Both Professors Lawrence and Matsuda encourage lawyers to help devise defensi-
ble strategies to address hate messages on carhpus. Matsuda writes that "[tihe legal imagi-
nation is a fruitful one.... Nothing inherent in law ties our hands, and lawyers, through the
ages, have displayed abundant skills of invention." Matsuda, supra note 13, at 2380. Simi-
larly, Lawrence writes:
We must also begin to think creatively as lawyers. We must embark upon the
development of a first amendment jurisprudence that is grounded in the reality of
our history and contemporary experience (particularly the experiences of the vic-
tims of oppression). We must eschew abstractions of first amendment theory that
proceed without attention to the dysfunction in the marketplace of ideas created
by the racism and unequal access to the market. We must think hard about how
best to launch legal attacks against the most indefensible forms of hate speech.
Good lawyers can create exceptions and narrow interpretations limiting the harm
of hate speech without opening the floodgates of censorship.
Lawrence, supra note 8, at 480-81.
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the community we wish to be. Compassion and mutual respect,
and the celebration of the differences among us, are the values we
must express and protect. A narrow regulation of hate epithets
represents a small, though necessary, beginning of the work that
needs to be done.
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